I take it that racism is a clear-cut moral wrong, or at least a case of wrongdoing which is quite close to being clear-cut. But what is wrong with racism? Racism is wrong because it entails or includes acts which are designed to favor a particular person or group over another person or group based on an irrelevant criterion, where that criterion is the person's or group's race/ethnicity. To see this, consider the historical mistreatment of African Americans. Many African American persons were used as slaves in the United States, deprived of various privileges to which they were entitled and subjected to various harmful treatments, and all because of their skin color. But there is, quite clearly, nothing morally impermissible about having a certain skin color. Even if there were, since African Americans are not responsible for their skin color, we would be unjustified in punishing them for their skin color, or for treating them as if they were responsible even if we did not believe they were.
I think plenty of politically conservative persons have a moral distaste, even a severe moral distaste, for racism. Even more, I think politically conservative persons desire the elimination of racism, and (in at least some cases) have no problem apologizing, on behalf of themselves or others, to victims of racist behavior. In these respects, I think we are very much on the same page. I would find myself in a state of moral outrage (and, I think, rightly so) if a politically conservative person observed some racist behavior but thought (or declared) it wrong to comfort the victim, or apologize.
But politically conservative persons often stop there, and I think that in doing so they are mistaken. To go further than this, in the minds of many conservatives, would be to engage in what is often called reverse discrimination. Of course, discrimination is broader than racism, but it includes racism. It also includes sexism, homophobia, ageism, and the like. If someone is a victim of racist behavior (say, because the person is African American), it would be wrong for us to privilege that person because he or she is African American. Apparently, many politically conservative persons believe that this is the chief problem with affirmative action, which seeks to favor certain "minority" groups, or groups which are discriminated against. Moreover, they often view this as an insurmountable problem; there just isn't any way for affirmative action to avoid the problem. I disagree, and let me explain why by appealing to a thought experiment.
Suppose a teacher has ten children in her tiny, Midwestern classroom. As it turns out, nine children have brown eyes and one child has blue eyes. All of the brown-eyed children are named George, and the blue-eyed child is named Alice. One day, the ten children go out to play on the playground. While on the playground, the Georges surround Alice, discover she has blue eyes, and subsequently beat Alice because she is blue-eyed. The Georges and Alice return to the classroom, and the teacher discovers that Alice has been beaten up. The teacher believes Alice has been treated unfairly, and she spends extra time talking with Alice, trying to comfort her and make Alice's day better.
By spending extra time with Alice and showing her special treatment of sorts, did the teacher do something unfair to the Georges? I do not think so. Alice clearly merited some extra time on the teacher's part due to her special need. What's more, the teacher did not favor Alice because Alice had blue eyes, but only because Alice had been abused. So it would appear that the teacher's special treatment of Alice was, in this case, morally justified.
Consider contemporary (and historical) parallels. African Americans and other groups are discriminated against in morally unjustified ways. It is (or would be) permissible for them, like Alice, to receive special treatment in relevant ways. For example, it would be permissible to offer your extra room to an African American family over a white family if the African American family had been discriminated against in their search for housing, but the white family had not. This doesn't entail that the African American family is morally superior to the white family; it merely entails that the African American family has some morally relevant features that the white family lacks, features in virtue of which there is stronger moral reason to help the one family over the other. (Consider a similar example: Family A hasn't eaten in over a week, whereas Family B is pretty hungry because they had an early lunch. Is Family A better than Family B? No; Family A is just in greater need than Family B.) Likewise, many women and elderly persons are discriminated against. There is thus a relevant distinguishing feature between them and those who lack experiences of discrimination (or something of equal importance).
Here is another possible objection, this time leveled against the parenthetical example above: Surely it is not Family B's fault that Family A hasn't eaten in over a week. If that is true, then Family B should not be punished for the circumstances of Family A. There is a straightforward response to this objection: Family B isn't being punished for the circumstances of Family A. Rather, there are stronger moral reasons for feeding Family A instead of Family B, and on that basis we would be justified in feeding Family A over Family B.
There are, I think, ways to show that affirmative action is not morally justified in today's world. For example, one could deny that any or much discrimination occurs. The evidence, however, strongly suggests otherwise, so this move is (epistemically) unjustified. For example, the phenomenon in social psychology known as Shopping While Black shows that African American persons are frequently accused or suspected of shoplifting, despite a lack of evidence on the part of the accuser(s) or suspicious persons. Likewise, examples of female subordination abound. Women are frequently paid significantly less than their (equal) male counterparts, abused, raped, and mutilated.
One could also suggest that, although there are better moral reasons for favoring one group over another, the reasons are not strong enough, or not the right kind of reasons, to justify favoring one group over another. Perhaps there is some legitimacy to this in a hypothetical sense. After all, if I was placed in a situation where I had to decide whether to kill Person A or Person B, even if Person A was a slightly better person (in a moral sense), it is doubtful that would justify killing Person B. Or perhaps the economy is such that jobs are needed and slim, and it would be wrong to favor an African American over a white person for the job even though the former, but not the latter, had been discriminated against. (If these judgments are incorrect, of course, it is a problem for the critic of affirmative action.) But I fail to see that the reasons for favoring one group over another aren't good enough reasons overall. Perhaps the example of the economy is plausible, but it is doubtfully true with respect to everything (e.g., schools, political offices, housing, etc.). Moreover, even if it were true with respect to everything, this would (it seems) be a merely contingent problem with affirmative action, not a necessary one. That is, affirmative action would be unjustified because of the contingent circumstances in which we find ourselves, but (clearly) those circumstances could be different and if they were, the same objection against affirmative action wouldn't hold true.
Another move would be to suggest that affirmative action interferes with free will. Some people, after all, do discriminate unjustly, but that hardly makes it permissible for us to interfere with their decisions. But this response has an extremely counterintuitive consequence, namely, that the Emancipation Proclamation was unjustified. Clearly, stopping slavery (or trying to stop slavery) is morally justified.
Yet another move would be to accept the examples but conclude that they are valid only with respect to individuals, but not to groups. I think it is clearly possible for there to be a "group example." Suppose that a very bright group of students - call them the Copernicans - are kicked out of school because they do not adhere to geocentrism. Suppose that a more scientifically sensible principal comes to rule the school, and on Character Recognition Day, the principal awards the Copernicans, and only the Copernicans. (The award can go only to one person or group, you see.) There are other intelligent students of course, many of whom are just as intelligent as the Copernicans. (Let us suppose, however, that they are a rather intelligent group of geocentrists.) Would the principal be justified in recognizing the Copernicans?
Those unpersuaded by this example should consider another example: Two college applicants, Judith and Michael, are competing for the last available student scholarship at Now-We're-Moral University. Both are exceptionally bright, hard-working, and have identical grades and ACT scores. But Now-We're-Moral University was previously called Driscoll University, an extremely sexist institution. They turned Judith down a number of times because she was a woman, but were willing to accept males with the same (and even lesser) qualifications. Would the committee at Now-We're-Moral University be justified in giving the scholarship to Judith over Michael? In light of prior circumstances, it seems far more fitting, and indeed permissible, for Judith to receive the scholarship over Michael. Again, it's not that there's something about Michael that is undeserving; he is quite deserving. But in light of her prior horrible experience with the university, Judith is more deserving that Michael.
Before I close, I will offer yet another example of justified "preferential" treatment. Military physicians are sometimes confronted with cases in which they must perform triage. If a physician has limited pain medication and must decide whether to administer it to only one of two patients, the first who will die if he doesn't have his pain relieved, and the second whose migraine will continue if his pain isn't relieved. It seems fairly obvious that it is permissible, and surely even obligatory, to administer the medication to the first patient.
I close with a final example, an appeal of sorts. Suppose you go out for lunch and discover an African American woman (to continue with our primary example) purchasing lunch. The manager, discovering that the woman is African American, refuses to serve her lunch. I think you would be morally outraged. Suppose that a short time after this, another woman steps up to purchase her lunch, but is a few pennies short of what she needs. You have only a few dollars and could pay for either person's lunch, but not both. Would you be morally justified in paying for the first woman's lunch over the second woman? I suspect your answer, if you understand the example and are honest, is the same as mine. If I am correct in this judgment, then it will likely seem true to you, as it does to me, that we can (and sometimes do) have good reason for favoring one person or group over another. Quite possibly (and even actually), in the case of a group, that group shares certain biological characteristics, such as sex or skin pigmentation. It should then be obvious what these facts entail for the one who accepts them: a reason to support affirmative action (in some form).
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