Does God Demean Us? A Problem for Satisfaction Theorists[1]
Blake Hereth (Cedarville University)
sbhereth@cedarville.edu
Introduction_______________
Some view the Atonement as an attempt by the Godhead to accomplish a certain primary purpose. Defenders of the Christus Victor view, for instance, ordinarily suggest that the primary aim of the Atonement is to overcome the powers of sin and darkness throughout the cosmos. Gregory Boyd is a contemporary defender of the view who sees the Christus Victor model as revealing the true and primary nature of the Atonement:
While various cultural and personal contexts may call for one model to be at times emphasized over others, these people argue that we should not attempt to defend any one view as more fundamental than others or attempt to fashion the various models into a single coherent framework. I’m deeply sympathetic to the sentiment. Yet it seems to me perfectly natural and, if carried out with an irenic spirit, potentially beneficial to strive for an encompassing conceptual model that might reveal an “inner logic” to all aspects of Christ’s work.[2]
Thus, for Boyd, the Atonement is a multi-faceted thing that can nonetheless be understood under a larger explanatory umbrella – in this case, the Christus Victor view. And it is not only Boyd or Christus Victor advocates who think this way. Thomas Schreiner, an advocate of penal substitutionary theory, claims that his preferred theory of the Atonement is not “the only truth about the atonement taught in the Scriptures.” Here, we find an admission of the plurality of themes within the Atonement. Yet Schreiner, like Boyd, wants to keep a particular view of the Atonement central:
I am claiming that penal substitution functions as the anchor and foundation for all other dimensions of the atonement when the Scriptures are considered as a canonical whole.[3]
I mention this because I want to clarify what I am doing in this paper. Let me begin my explanation by recognizing that almost every view of the Atonement, if not every view, has been subjected to serious criticism; and, while I have not seen this in much of the academic literature, it seems that there is often a popular move to avoid these criticisms by an appeal to the plural nature of the Atonement. In response to many criticisms, this makes sense. For instance, if I objected that Christus Victor models fail to incorporate our need for spiritual healing, an advocate like Boyd might reply that there are other facets of the Atonement which account for spiritual healing, and that those facets are consistent with the primary emphasis on Christ’s victory in the Christus Victor view. I have no objection to this response.
Other criticisms, however, are not so easily done away with. Some have objected that penal substitutionary models, and satisfaction models (or theories) in general, suggest that it is morally permissible to punish an innocent person for crimes he has not committed, where that person is Christ. At this point, it seems to me to do little good to appeal to other facets of the Atonement, and here is why: Either those facets show that Christ was guilty or not being punished, or they do not. If they show that Christ was guilty or not being punished, then those facets are inconsistent with penal substitutionary or satisfaction theories. If they do not show that Christ was guilty or not being punished, then it is unclear in what sense they help the problem. So, perhaps the fact that an innocent person (Christ) was punished somehow helps heal us from the stain of sin. But even if that were true, it is unclear how that shows that it is permissible to punish an innocent person.[4]
It is this second sort of objection I intend to level against satisfaction theories of the Atonement. More specifically, I will object to satisfaction theories of the Atonement on the grounds that such theories, if announced, would demean human suffering and (by consequence) human dignity. None of this suggests that the tenets of satisfaction theories are themselves objectionable, only that announcing those tenets is objectionable. Hence, one can remain a satisfaction theorist and avoid my objection simply by suggesting that no member of the Godhead has ever announced the basic tenets of satisfaction theories.
What are satisfaction theories, and what are these central tenets I claim to be objectionable if announced? I will briefly draw on historical and contemporary defenders of satisfaction theories to explain what satisfaction theories amount to, and will then introduce my moral criticism.
What Is ‘Satisfaction Theory’?_______________
Saint Anselm of Canterbury defended an early version of satisfaction theories in his book Cur Deus Homo. Sometime after Anselm’s questioner Boso asks what debt we owe God, Anselm replies:
This is the debt which angel and man owe to God, so that no one sins if he pays it and anyone who does not pay it, sins. This is justice or rectitude of will, which makes persons upright or right in heart, that is, in will. This is the only and the total honor which we owe to God and which God exacts of us.[5]
In this short paragraph, Anselm articulates sin, an understanding of what we owe to God (i.e., total honor), and the way in which we are required to honor God. Anselm suggests that a “rectitude of will” or being “right in heart” is what God requires of us. Thomas Schreiner echoes a similar sentiment:
The standard in the garden was not that Adam and Eve should trust God the majority of the time or even 99 percent of the time. God condemns them to death after they violated his requirements once. That God demands perfection fits with James 2:10, where James says, “For whoever keeps the whole law but fails in one point has become accountable for all of it.”[6]
What Anselm and Schreiner seem to have in mind is that moral perfection is required to avoid sin, and one is morally perfect just in case one is right in heart, obeys the commands of God, etc. But Anselm makes it clear that sin is an issue because it deprives God of the honor due to Him. On Anselm’s account, there is a way to repair this problem:
Now, as long as [the sinner] does not repay what he has plundered, he remains at fault. Neither is it enough merely to return what was taken away, but on account of the insult committed, he must give back more than he took away.[7]
Anselm offers an example. Suppose I harmed someone by robbing him of his health. In that case, I do not offer a satisfactory repayment if I merely restore him to health, since that just equals things out; I simply return things to the way they were. Consequently, I must go beyond this. I must give him back more than I took from him, so as to right the wrong in a satisfactory way. Hence:
…when someone pays back what he unjustly pilfered, he must give what could not be demanded of him if he had not defrauded the other person. Thus, therefore, everyone who sins must pay to God the honor he has taken away, and this is satisfaction, which every sinner must make to God.[8]
Anselm is envisioning Christ as the means to repay to the Father the honor the Father is due. Christ does this by ‘applying’ his holy life for sinners. Similarly, although differently in crucial respects[9], other satisfaction theorists, and penal substitutionary theorists in particular, offer similar lines of thought. J.I. Packer writes:
If [the Father] could have spared his own Son and still redeemed, we may be sure he would have done so. God doesn’t make needless gestures. The Father’s sacrifice of the Son tells us, as sure as eggs are eggs (as we used to say back in England), that it had to be done this way. Our redemption couldn’t be achieved at any lesser cost.[10]
Thomas Schreiner offers similar thoughts:
When God’s holiness is defiled, judgment follows as a retribution. This is evident from the earliest pages of the Bible: Adam and Eve were expelled from the garden because of their sin; the world was engulfed by a flood because of the wickedness of human beings (cf. Gen 6:5); those who erected the tower of Babel were dispersed because of their arrogance (Gen 11:1-9).[11]
Moreover, “The death of the non-human animals shows that the penalty for sin is death,” and biblical language regarding the sacrifice of non-human animals being “a soothing aroma” “indicates that they satisfy God’s wrath, that they appease his anger.” Finally, “the requirement of sacrifice points ahead to the death of Christ….”[12]
D.A. Carson makes similar claims regarding Romans 3:25, in which the Father is said to “set forth his Son as a propitiation”: the verse “sets up the problem in terms of the wrath of God. Now God has taken action to turn that wrath away.” Furthermore,
…the God against whom the offenses were done pronounced sentence and sent his Son to bear the sentence (Rom 5:8); he made him who had no sin to be sin for us (2 Cor 5:21). And the purpose of this substitution was that “in him we might become the righteousness of God.”[13]
At least several things are made clear by these passages. The first thing made clear is the moral state of human persons.[14] Evidently, human persons have become morally blameworthy before God. Anselm claims this is because human beings have not given God the honor She is due, perhaps by honoring themselves only or primarily (or at all). Thomas Schreiner suggests, more broadly, that human persons have transgressed the law of God and are consequently under damnation.
A second thing made clear is the resulting moral requirements. Because human persons have sinned, there must be atonement. Things must be made right. Furthermore, the requirement for the sins of human persons is sacrifice, usually in the form of bloodshed or death. For example, Hebrews 9:22 states that “without the shedding of blood there is no forgiveness of sins,” and Romans 6:23 claims that “the wages of sin is death.” The goal of sacrifice is to restore what has been lost, which in almost every case is a right relationship with God.
Thirdly, satisfaction theorists maintain that the sacrifice of Christ was successful for human persons whereas other sacrifices (such as animal sacrifices) were not, at least not ultimately. Perhaps this is because Christ was morally perfect, or because Christ did so freely, or because only a Divine Person can substitute for a human person. But whatever the reason, what Christ did actually worked and other sacrifices did not (at least not ultimately).
Fourthly, satisfaction theorists often rely on Scripture to justify satisfaction theory, as some of these authors have shown. I am not going to be a stickler here. The satisfaction theorist need not show me that each and every tenet is explicitly taught in Scripture. Perhaps the logical relations between the tenets are such that, if a given tenet A is clearly taught, A implies B, where B is also a central tenet (that is, they are implicitly taught in Scripture). In the interest of a broad and charitable ‘arguing space,’ I want to give the satisfaction theorist plenty of room for intellectual footwork.
My Moral Objection_______________
I have claimed that satisfaction theorists who rely on Scripture are in moral trouble. Specifically, I argue that satisfaction theory, as understood above, is not morally permissible to ‘announce’ to human persons who suffer. Let us begin by recalling that the sacrifice of Christ is necessary according to satisfaction theorists, and this entails that God’s need for sacrifice (whatever is motivating it) was not satisfied by other sacrifices. What is more, the satisfaction theorist who relies on Scripture to justify the core tenets of satisfaction theory is committed to the view that God has made sufficiently clear[15] (implicitly or explicitly) that this is the case. But that is the problem: God would be announcing that the sacrifices of billions of non-human animals and humans are insufficient to change the moral stance of the performers. They simply do not measure up; they are not successful. But making this clear is horribly demeaning because it downplays the significance of the sacrifices made by non-human animals and humans. Our sacrifices – our deaths, our sufferings – have not appeased God. The expectations of human beings for centuries have been disappointed: Abraham nearly sacrificed Isaac for something that God has announced was insufficient. It did not matter for the Atonement, at least not ultimately. It is difficult to imagine something more disappointing and degrading. Such a request is morally akin to entering Auschwitz mid-Holocaust and declaring that the sacrifices Jews have made thus far were “not enough” to satisfy God.
Strictly speaking, none of this entails that the sacrifices of human beings or non-human animals do not matter to God. Nor does it entail that God has not been paying attention to our sacrifices. It is just the way things are that the sacrifices of human beings and non-human animals, in almost all their forms (if not all their forms), do not satisfy God. She will be placated only by Christ’s sacrifice – again, for whatever reason – and it is announcing the insufficiency of our sacrifices that is impermissible, demeaning, and the like.
This is where matters become somewhat troublesome for the satisfaction theorist. The satisfaction theorist, as I have suggested, could avoid my objection by claiming that the core tenets of satisfaction theory are true, but they have just not been announced by God. It follows from this that God has not announced the core tenets of satisfaction theory in Scripture. At this point, the satisfaction theorist loses the support of Scripture. This does not mean that the satisfaction theorist cannot justify satisfaction theory in some other way (perhaps as Swinburne has). But there are some drawbacks for the satisfaction theorist if she accepts my objection. First, she should regard announcing satisfaction theory as morally impermissible, even if she thinks it is true. Second, she loses the support of Scripture which, while not entirely devastating to supporting satisfaction theory, does allow other views on the Atonement to gain outweighing plausibility (assuming they can be based on Scripture). This is perhaps not too concerning if the satisfaction theorist adopts a multi-themed Atonement in which satisfaction theory is only a part, but the satisfaction theorist nonetheless loses some of her (potential) justification.
Objections_______________
I will now offer several objections to the moral criticism I have offered.
The Difference-in-Sacrifice Objection: It is perfectly permissible and coherent to suggest that human and animal sacrifices are insufficient in certain ways and maintain respect for the dignity and moral significance of those sacrifices. For instance, I can permissibly say that my brother’s tithe has not helped with the bills or that my grandfather’s death really has not helped me open a can of green beans.
My response to this is that God is not suggesting that human and animal sacrifices have been useless with respect to something irrelevant, distantly relevant, or immediately relevant but trivial; rather, She is suggesting that human and non-human animal sacrifices have been ineffective in ‘switching’ our moral stance before God. The significance of this to us is compounded by how very much these sacrifices have meant to us. For example, it mattered deeply to Abraham that Isaac’s death please God and restore Abraham’s faithful stance before God. With little doubt, he would have been devastated to hear that his son’s death was ultimately unsuccessful, not nearly enough to assuage God’s wrath or restore Abraham’s closeness with God. When we consider the deaths of our parents, grandparents, siblings, spouses, children, aunts, uncles, spouses, etc. (to say nothing of the millions of non-human animals killed in sacrifice to God), and then contemplate that God has told us that none of these deaths is ultimately reparative, the problem is merely reintroduced.
The Unintended Sacrifice Objection: The deaths of the millions of Jewish persons during the Holocaust were sacrifices in the sense that they gave something up; however, their deaths were not sacrifices in the sense that they intended to bring about the end of God’s wrath, restoration of God’s honor, or something similar. Therefore, the “sacrifices” to which I have been referring are not sacrifices in the relevant sense. If that is the case, then when God suggests that our sacrifices are insufficient, it is implausible to suppose that She is referring to (continuing with our example) the deaths of Jewish persons during the Holocaust. This would entail that God is in fact not suggesting that the sacrifices did not matter, since the sacrifices were not sacrifices of the relevant sort.
This objection is problematic on at least two grounds. First, it is doubtful that no sacrifices of the relevant sort have been offered. Countless believers have offered their very lives in sacrifice to God, both in devotion and in martyrdom. The first century is crimson with the blood of martyrs who devoted their lives to God and offered their dooming allegiance to God in the final hours. Innumerable priests, monks, nuns, and laity have, in accordance with the commands of Saint Paul, offered their bodies “as living sacrifices.”[16] Prophets in the Old Testament sacrificed food, water, shelter, and their own lives in order that God might be pleased with them. Primordial religions show that numerous human sacrifices were offered to calm the wrath of a god of some sort or other. The list could easily stretch far and wide. Moreover, non-human animals have been purposefully sacrificed to appease the wrath or honor of God. This is true even if it is not maintained by the satisfaction theorist. (Although there is good reason to think it would be, as Schreiner and others have shown.)
But let us suppose the objection is true. It seems to me that it makes no real difference since it still suggests that the deaths and sufferings of human beings and non-human animals do not satisfy God’s requirements. At first, we considered the possibility that the sacrifices of human persons were morally insufficient insofar as human persons are morally imperfect. Now, the reason has simply changed: Human persons (and human non-persons, and non-human animals) did not intend to offer sacrifices unto God, and thus their sacrifices were morally insufficient. They were not ‘intentional’ enough to satisfy God. If announced, that too is still demeaning.
The ‘Still Justified’ Objection: Even if God’s announcements were demeaning to human dignity, it does not follow (at least not obviously) that there can be no justification for such an announcement. Consider a modified Auschwitz example where the Nazis running the camp threaten to kill the Jews unless one sacrifice is made. In the best interest of the Jews, I announce that I still require a sacrifice, knowing this will demean their suffering (since it suggests that the sacrifices they have undergone have not satisfied the Nazis) but will ultimately save their lives since only then can they know that their debt has been paid. Similarly, a satisfaction theorist might contend that God’s announcement about the sacrifice was intended to make known Her requirements for our salvation. She was trying to save us by letting us know that we needed to be saved, that we needed to know about the sacrifice.
It is plausible to dismiss this, although it is admirable in certain ways. However, it is implausible to suppose, as this objection does[17], that requests which demean human dignity are morally permissible on grounds of their utility. Suppose it was demanded of me that I rape a serial killer to save ten adults, and that this was the only way I could prevent the demise of the ten adults. Plausibly, rapists demean their victims. Plausibly, it would be morally impermissible for me to rape a serial killer to save ten adults. Granted, saving the ten adults is morally desirable, but there are permissible and impermissible ways to go about doing that. Since pure utility does not appear to justify demeaning human dignity, the objection fails.
Secondly, if we’re going to invoke justification for prima facie wrongs, why not suppose God could, say, lie about the efficacy of human and non-human animal sacrifices? Perhaps She could say that their sacrifices were successful in important ways, but that Christ’s sacrifice was nonetheless an important piece of the redemptive puzzle. This seems far less problematic than demeaning human and non-human animals. Moreover, it allows much room for God to stress the importance of placing our faith in Christ’s sacrifice.[18]
The Death-Satisfies-God Objection[19]: A satisfaction theorist might contend that God is, in fact, satisfied with the deaths of human beings and non-human animals, and that Christ’s sacrifice does not suggest otherwise. Instead, Christ’s death is only for those who have not died, and thus have not atoned for their sin. Christ is acting as their substitute, filling in the blanks they could not fill; He is not acting as the substitute for others.
This reply has at least two problems. The first is that a large portion of the problem remains, since it suggests that non-mortal sacrifices, such as extreme suffering, do not satisfy God’s wrath. To see why the problem remains, consider a simple case: Take all the human beings alive today, consider all the suffering they experience, and then consider that God (according to the satisfaction theorist) is not satisfied. It is reasonable to think that this returns us to the Auschwitz example and its moral.
A second issue with this response is that it leaves certain key stones unturned. It is unclear why the deaths of innocent beings such as human fetuses and non-human animals are insufficient to satisfy God’s wrath (or for vicarious redemption). Apparently, Christ, but not them, has substituted for others. Again, whatever the explanation, it remains the case that fetal and animal deaths aren’t enough for God’s standards of moral reconciliation. Back to the Auschwitz example – except this time, you announce that the deaths of the fetuses were insufficient.
Conclusion_______________
I have argued that satisfaction theorists should not use Scripture to justify certain core tenets of satisfaction theory. I have contended that announcements of the form “human and/or non-human animal sacrifices are insufficient” are morally impermissible on the grounds that such announcements are degrading to the moral efforts and losses by human beings and non-human animals. Given God’s moral perfection, it is plausible to suppose She would not make such an announcement even if satisfaction theory was a true theory. Consequently, it is plausible to suppose that there are no such announcements made by God, including in Scripture.
If all of that is correct, then satisfaction theorists ought to look for justification in places other than Scripture. Swinburne and Anselm have offered excellent prima facie defenses of satisfaction theories, for instance, and they are certainly not alone. By no means are they without possible justification. But they will nonetheless have lost a significant source of justification – namely Scripture.
Works Consulted
Anselm. Why God Became Man, Book I, chapter XI, in Joseph M. Colleran (trans.) Why God Became Man and The Virgin Conception and Original Sin (Albany, NY: Magi Books, Inc.), 1969.
Boyd, Gregory. “Christus Victor View,” in James Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (eds.) The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press), 2006, pp.23-66.
Carson, D.A. “Atonement in Romans 3:21-26,” in Charles E. Hill and Frank A. James III (eds.) The Glory of the Atonement (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press), 2004, pp.119-139.
Packer, J.I. “The Necessity of the Atonement,” in Gabriel N.E. Fluhrer (ed.) Atonement (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing Company), 2010, pp.1-18.
Ryken, Phillip Graham. “The Medieval Achievement” in Richard D. Phillips (ed.) Precious Blood: The Atoning Work of Christ (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books), 2009, pp.123-144.
Schreiner, Thomas R. “Penal Substitution View,” in James Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (eds.) The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press), 2006, pp.67-116.
Swinburne, Richard. Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1989.
[1] I would like to thank Jim McBrayer and John White for helpful discussions on this paper. And I would like to thank Ryan Peterson and John White for providing helpful research assistance.
[2] Boyd, Gregory. “Christus Victor View,” in James Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (eds.) The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press), 2006, pp.23-24.
[3] Schreiner, Thomas R. “Penal Substitution View,” in James Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (eds.) The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press), 2006, p.67. Admittedly, Schreiner goes where Boyd does not seem comfortable to suggest that his theory “is the heart and soul of an evangelical view of the atonement.” I share more of Boyd’s hesitation (or silence) than Schreiner’s confidence.
[4] It is not central to the thesis advanced here, but I do affirm that it is never morally permissible to intentionally harm innocent persons.
[5] Anselm. Why God Became Man, Book I, chapter XI, in Joseph M. Colleran (trans.) Why God Became Man and The Virgin Conception and Original Sin (Albany, NY: Magi Books, Inc.), 1969, p.84 (emphasis original).
[6] Schreiner, Thomas. “Penal Substitution View,” in ibid, p.73.
[7] Anselm. Why God Became Man, ibid, p.84.
[8] Anselm. Why God Became Man, ibid, p.85.
[9] The difference between Anselm and Schreiner is that Anselm is more concerned with satisfying God’s honor, whereas Schreiner is more concerned with satisfying God’s wrath. But this distinction makes no difference for my purposes, since both advocates and both theories agree that a sacrifice (and more specifically, a morally perfect sacrifice) must be made for satisfaction.
[10] Packer, J.I. “The Necessity of the Atonement,” in Gabriel N.E. Fluhrer (ed.) Atonement (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing Company), 2010, p.8.
[11] Schreiner, Thomas R. “Penal Substitution View,” in ibid, p.78.
[12] Schreiner, Thomas R. “Penal Substitution View,” in ibid, p.83.
[13] Carson, D.A. “Atonement in Romans 3:21-26,” in Charles E. Hill and Frank A. James III (eds.) The Glory of the Atonement (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press), 2004, p.134.
[14] I say human persons instead of human beings because I think they are different and also because I think there is nothing about satisfaction theory in general that rules out the view that human non-persons (such as fetuses) are sinless.
[15] And by “sufficiently clear,” I mean “sufficiently clear to justify satisfaction theory in Scripture.”
[16] Romans 12:1 (English Standard Version).
[17] And it essentially depends on this sort of justification, at least as presented. For if it is not the case that insults to human dignity can be justified in virtue of consequences, the objection never gets off the ground.
[18] Perhaps the objector wishes to go further than this. Perhaps it’s the case that, in order for redemption to occur, we must believe that Christ’s sacrifice was the one and only efficacious sacrifice. This is an intriguing modification, but I see no plausibility to it.
[19] Ryan Peterson has suggested this to me in conversation.
2 comments:
I just wanted to say that I enjoyed this paper.
Thanks, Emily. What did you enjoy about it?
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