A Brief Defense of Philip Quinn

[Disclaimer: By discussing the work of Philip Quinn, I am not suggesting that I agree with his views, although what I claim to be true in this essay is representative of my own view(s).]

Philip Quinn, now deceased, but former John A. O'Brien professor of philosophy at Notre Dame, has argued in favor of the moral example theory of the Christian atonement. In a paper entitled "Abelard on Atonement: 'Nothing Unintelligible, Arbitrary, Illogical, or Immoral About It"[1], Quinn argues that Christ's moral example should be seen as (at least) the primary theme in the Christian atonement. Roughly, the moral example theory claims that Christ's self-sacrificial life and death were for the purpose of loving the world intensely, for continuing to love even during persecution. This love toward us motivates us to love God in a self-sacrificial way, presenting our bodies as a living sacrifice before God (Romans 12:1). As Saint John rightly points out, "We love Him because He first loved us" (1 John 4:19, emphasis mine). As Quinn puts it:

My suggestion is that what Abelard has to contribute to our thinking about the Atonement is the idea that divine love, made manifest throughout the life of Christ but especially in his suffering and dying, has the power to transform human sinners, if they cooperate, in ways that fit them for everlasting life in intimate union with God.[2]

Quinn by no means argues that the moral example theory should be seen as the one and only theme in the Christian atonement. Indeed, he argues that Peter Abelard's defense of the moral example theory is (and was intended by Abelard to be) compatible with multiple themes of the atonement, including penal substitution. As he says,

I do not claim that the motif of transformative divine love is the only idea that can help us appreciate the Atonement. I am attracted to the view that the Atonement is a mystery not to be fully fathomed by human understanding but best grasped in terms of a plurality of metaphors and models.[3]

But Quinn, as I said, does argue that the moral example theory is central to the Christian doctrine of the atonement, and that the moral example theory better explains Christ's life and death than some other theories of the atonement (e.g., satisfaction theories).

Toward the end of his essay, Quinn considers an objection to the view he has defended:

It might be objected that it is empirically implausible to suppose that the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth have had such an influence on subsequent history. If he had never lived, the human condition would now not be much different from what it actually is because other inspiring examples of love would have had approximately the same good effects.[4]

The objection is this: The moral example theory fails to make sense of Christ as the unique path of salvation for human beings, since we likely would have been transformed through following the example of others (e.g., Mother Theresa) if Christ had never lived. Quinn offers this retort:

My response to this objection is skeptical. According to another scenario, the human condition would now be very much worse than it actually is if Jesus had never lived because fallen human nature would have been progressively enfeebled by an increasing burden of sin. I doubt that empirical information about the actual course of history by itself supports the counterfactual that underlies the objection rather than the rival counterfactual that I have set forth.[5]

Thus, according to Quinn, there are two competing counterfactuals here. The first is his, and the second underlies the objection:

(CF1) If Christ became incarnate, suffered and died, the human race would be far better off from the standpoint of salvific moral transformation than if He had not.

(CF2) If Christ had failed to become incarnate, suffer and die, the human race would be roughly the same as it is today, from the standpoint of salvific moral transformation.

I am much more confident than Quinn appears to be when it comes to the competition between CF1 (Quinn's counterfactual) and CF2 (the objection's underlying counterfactual). Quinn claims that he is 'skeptical' as to whether the rival counterfactual is more plausible than his own. I think it's far more plausible to suppose that CF1 is true than that CF2 is true.[6] To see why, consider the following counterfactuals:

(CF3) If Christ had failed to become incarnate, suffer and die, then most of the human race would have failed to be inspired by His example to become incarnate, suffer and die.

(CF4) If Christ had failed to become incarnate, suffer and die, then there would have been an equal or superior moral example such that the human race would have been roughly the same as it is today, from the standpoint of salvific moral transformation.

I think we CF3 is quite plausible, unless it's more plausible to suppose that the story would have been concocted from thin air (and it isn't by any stretch) and would have, despite being false, inspired a huge percentage of the human race to live rightly before God. To see how this counterfactual supports CF1, consider that many human persons, including me, have been so inspired by the life of Jesus Christ. He has been, for us, the most compelling example of love. It is very likely the case that we would lack this inspiration if Christ had never become incarnate, suffered and died.[7] But because of the enormous influence Christ's example has had in our lives, and because we would be utterly without it in the world in which Christ doesn't become incarnate, suffers and dies, we very likely would be less transformed in that world than we are in this world (where Christ becomes incarnate, suffers and dies). Consequently, it is plausible to affirm CF3, which supports CF1.

What of CF4? Frankly, we have no good reason to believe that other moral examples would have 'popped up' if Christ had not, would have had roughly the same influence on us if Christ had not, etc. Why suppose there would have been a (roughly) equally compelling moral example? The example of Mother Theresa will not work, since even her life was transformed primarily by the incarnation, suffering and death of Jesus Christ. (And I don't see why I should believe that she would have been just as inspired, or more inspired, by someone else.)

So, in a nutshell, we have strong reasons to affirm CF3, which supports CF1, and no good reason to affirm CF4, which CF2 needs to be plausibly affirmed. Thus, CF1 is significantly more plausible than CF2, for it just so happens that many human lives (I smile to think how many) have been transformed by the example of Christ, and we would very likely lack that Christocentric transformation if there were no Christ. (Consider: Would you be transformed by the example of Princess Diana of Wales if there were no Princess Diana of Wales? I hardly think so.) And there is no reason to suppose that there would have been someone who would have transformed us just as much if Christ had not come. I therefore conclude that Quinn's counterfactual is more plausible than the rival counterfactual he concocts. If the moral example theory has difficulty making sense of the uniqueness of Christ for salvation, then, it will be on other grounds.

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[1] Quinn, Philip. "Abelard on Atonement: 'Nothing Unintelligible, Arbitrary, Illogical, or Immoral About It,'" in Michael Rea (ed.) Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology: Volume I: Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2009, pp.348-364.

[2] Ibid, p.360.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid, p.362.

[5] Ibid, pp.362-363.
[6] I believe there are true and false counterfactuals and that they can be known, both as probabilities and certainties. But here, one need only agree that it is possible for counterfactual truths to be known as probabilities, which nearly everyone grants. For readers who are interested in a fuller defense of the truth status of counterfactual conditionals, see David Lewis' Counterfactuals (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers Inc.), 1973. For a defense of counterfactuals as a particular theory of providence, see the following books and essays: Thomas Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 2006; Thomas Flint, "Divine Providence," in Thomas P. Flint and Michael Rea (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2009, pp.262-285; Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 1988, edited with an introduction by Alfred J. Freddoso; William Lane Craig, "The Middle-Knowledge View," in James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy, Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press), 2001, pp.119-143.

[7] Of course, I do not mean to suggest that we would not have been inspired at all. Moral examples like the Buddha and Princess Diana would likely still have inspired us. But insofar as Christ has been, for many of us, the supreme moral example, and insofar as Christ's example has had primary or supreme sway over our moral transformation, we would very likely be significantly worse off, or significantly less transformed, if He had not become incarnate, suffered and died.