On Chiding Philosophers: God and Logic

I've heard people claim that God can violate "the laws of logic." There are various logical 'laws,' so this claim is either extremely non-specific or is intended to encompass all the laws of logic. I think people who claim that God can violate the laws of logic have in mind a broad view of the laws; that is, they mean to suggest that God can do anything She wants to do. My experience is that some people use specific logical laws as examples, such as the Law of Non-contradiction. In a fairly simple form, the Law of Non-contradiction is this: For any two propositions, p and q, and some time t, if p is such that p and q is such that not-p, then it cannot be the case that both p and q are true at t. In other words, contradictions aren't possible. They simply cannot occur. But according to some, God can make it the case that p and q are both true at the same time.

I think this is mistaken. Peter van Inwagen puts the matter well when he writes, "This position has (to be gentle) little to recommend it."[1] As I see the matter, if God brings it about that p and q are both true at the same time, then the conjunction p&q is decisively not logically impossible (since it occurs), and thus p and q are in fact logically compatible propositions. Put differently, if I were told that God had done something logically impossible, I would respond, "Then it must be possible. After all, God did it, so it must have been something that She could do, and thus it must have been something that could (broadly speaking) be done."

Some persons' capacity for intellectual obstinacy surprises me. But I think I have devised an argument that will be (and should be) compelling to those who reject the reasons I ordinarily give. Humorously enough, the argument grants the premise that God can violate the Law of Non-contradiction. Here is that argument:

(P1) For any two actions, A and not-A, God is capable of bringing it about at some time t both that A is true and that not-A is true.

(P2) If P1 is true, then God can perform any and every evil action EA while simultaneously being morally perfect, sinless, completely good, and the like.

(C1) Therefore, God can perform any and every evil action EA while simultaneously being morally perfect, sinless, completely good, and the like.

Recall: I'm granting P1 for the sake of argument. C1 follows logically from the premises (by modus ponens). So the crucial premise in need of defense is P2. Here's my defense: If God can bring about genuine logical contradictions, then God can simultaneously perform only good acts and perform any or all evil acts. (What would prevent Her from doing so?) No doubt my critics will respond that God is incapable of violating Her own nature, which is essentially morally perfect. But this will not help, for being capable of violating the Law of Non-contradiction entails that God can make both of the following true: "God violates Her nature at t" and "God fails to violate Her nature at t." In other words, God can at the same time make it the case that She violates Her nature and that She does not violate Her own nature. Thus, accepting P1 entails that God can violate Her nature.

For the even more stubborn critic: You might claim that, given P1, God can also make it the case that the state of affairs "God violates Her nature at t and God fails to violate Her nature at t" is non-contradictory. That's true, but it won't help, firstly because God could also (given P1) simultaneously make it the case that "'God violates Her nature at t and God fails to violate Her nature at t' is non-contradictory" is contradictory. Secondly, even if it were true that God could make it the case that "God violates Her nature at t and God fails to violate Her nature at t" was non-contradictory, She could also refrain from doing so, leaving the proposition contradictory but still actualizing it.

For these reasons, among others, I reject P1. The view that God can violate the laws of logic is both senseless and entails that God can be utterly sinless and be completely sinful, that God can keep all Her promises and fail to keep all Her promises, that God cannot violate Her nature and that God can violate Her nature, etc. If these are insufficient reasons for the Christian critic, I suppose I will try again, but continuing to hold P1 in light of these examples strikes me as an instance of exceedingly unjustified intellectual stubbornness.

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[1] Van Inwagen, Peter. "Three Persons in One Being," in Michael Rea (ed.) Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology: Volume I: Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2009, p.64.